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AOSTRACT

Responding to those who want to consign ideologies to the
dustbin of history, I make what is perhaps an unexpected con
nection between ideologies and scientific theories to ward off
what may amount to be an assault on the former's cognitive
value. Although there are significant differences t--etween ideo
logies and scientific theories, particularly in terms of objectivity
and openness to innovation, I find that they nre similar insofar
as each is a cognitive fund which allows us to make sense of the
world that we live in. Part of the sense-making quality of
scientific theories is that they allow us to constitute and appre
ciate facts about the world. In other words, the facts of science
are theory-laden. Similarly, ideologies, such as Noam Chomsky's
libertarian socialism or anarchism are also cognitive funds with
sense-making qualities which Jaden facts, albeit facts of a diffe
rent kind. More than that, however, I argue that the ability
of ideologies to constitute and appreciate facts gives us reason
for thinking the decline of ideologies as shapers of global polities
to be premature.
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longer shapers of global politics to be premature.
PART 0 Nt; : fDEOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC T!;EOR.Y
INTRODUCTION

f. Some ~heorist~ believ~ that we are witnessiog the resurgence
~ -ideologies and tdc.olog,caJ conflicts, whiJe others declare that
istory ha.s come to au end with the triumph of liberal demo:t~I. others have grown weary of ,ideologies and have
fi O t · eir obsolescence. Indeed, a recent essay by Harvard
dessor Sa?,1ue.l P. Huntington, in which he replaces the "clash
o l eolog1es with the "clash of civilizations" as tile dominant
flobal form of conilict, is just the latest attempt to consign ideoogies to the ~ustbin of history.• If Huntington's thesis is
cor~e~t, ideologies are no longer the prime movers of global
politics. But does this alleged retreat from the political scene
s~ggest that ideologies are less capable of in.fluencing bow we
v!ev,, the world? Io sho(t, docs hi.s lh.esis have drastic implications for tile cognitive statl,lS o{ ideologies? It need not.
. ,

;~:i:d
P;~

Th~ ljt':ramre dealing with the differences between ideology
a~d sc,e~ttfie theory is considerable. Ideologies are often associa!ed with closed, dogmatic, and in.flexible systems of mere
~hef and falsehood, whereas scientific theories are thought to
m~olve knowledge and truth. Although there is much to be
said for these .characte~izations, this ideology-science antithesis
<toes not provide us wtth an honest depiction of these conceptual frameworks. This is because they do not ad-;t th
.
bT
h ·d
·
•=
e poss11 ity t at i eolog1es and scientific theories have something in
common. ~he present paper will argue that these frameworks
are n.ot as ~1sparate ~s i_s often thought. Jo Part One I claim
t hat !deolog1es and sc1eot11ic theories have a common function .
that is, they aUow us to make sense of the world that we live in'
In Part Two I argue that this sense-making function is mosi
!early demonstrated in the way that theories provide us with a
fram<:work of understanding in order for "something" to be
cons!Jtuted as~ fact. In the final part I claim that ideologies,
because of thetr sense-mak,ng quality, also exhibit this constit~t1onal feature, and that it is because of this kinship to facts
t at we have reason to believe the claim that ideologies are no

It should first be noted that the concept of ideology i·s not of
recent origin. On the contrary, the term 'ideology' was coined
by the French post-Enlightenment theor.ist Antoine Destuft de
Tracy. De Tracy and the other Ideologues thought that each
person has the ability to ascertain what .is true and what is tight
through reason and experience.2 As harmless as it ,may sound ,
this view bad profound ramifications for Freneh Society., for it
meant a rejection of the authoritarianism of the a11cie11 regime
as well as a call to perfect society. The method that was developed to carry out this program came to be called '· ideology,"
wliich they understood to be more of a "technique for discovering truth and dissolving illusion" than a body of infallible
philosophical and political doctrine.J In short, it was a .newly
conceived science- the "science of ideas, " and it was because
of its role as a means of bringing about change in French society
that ideology acquired its political character.
Although the concept is stil l associated with politics, it uas
undergone various shifts in meaning since its introduction in the
eighteenth century. The changes range from the negative or
pejorative shift sponsored most notably by Marx- a shift contrasting ideology with reality and labelling it "false consciousness"- to the present-day nonpejorarive concepliol1s found in
the writings of some contemporary social scientists and philosophers.• Indeed , one who rcv.icws the llteratme dealing with
the concept of ideology may easily come away believing that
there is no core meaning among the various conceptions- conceptual anarchy at its worst ! Those who believe this a.re mistaken, however. A closer examination of the litetature finds
two common elements : an ideational element, which is not
value neut.cal, and an action-program , The conjunction of
these elements is what J mean by ideology.
fn saying that ideology possesses an ideational element , 1
simply mean that ideology can be thought of ·a s a set ofideas,
the members of which are identifiable by their expression in
certain statements. 5 Of course, not evety set of ideas ton~tit utes an ideology, but only those by which 'peOple engage in the
praciicc of public affairs. Or, as the politit:al philos1rpher
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Martin Seliger puts it, an ideology is a set of ideas by which
people "posit, explain and justify ends and means of organised
social action, irrespective of whether such action aims to preserve, amend, uproot or rebuild a given social order. "6 Its
intim~ie association with politics, however, should not lead us
to beheve that ideology is dissociated from the social and economic aspects of modern life. All three aspects, to be sure are
i~tertwin~d in both domestic and foreign affairs. The mul;iplicity and mterrelatedness is readily seen, for instance, in Noam
Chomsky's libertaria n socialism or anarchism, an ideology in
which the military adventurism and imperialism of the Western
powers (including the United States) is a defining category.'
The scope of the above conception of ideology is, however,
so broad that some may conclude that an ideology is coextensive with a political point of view, a political ou llook or a
~ litical philosophy. Terms acquire their meaning by s~ifymg what does not count as such an item . Thus the term ideology must be shown not to cover everything. The political
scientist Preston King does just that by distinguishing between
ideology and these nther notions. In his essay "An Ideological
Fallacy," King cites three characteristics that distinguishes ideology from these others. They are (I) integration (or coherence),
(2) substance, and (3) orientation towards action. According
to .King, ideology is the only one that exhibits all three characteristics. 8 The others are generally weak in at least one area :
a political point of view is not integrated into a general o utlook; a political outlook is more integrated than a political
point of view, but an outlook may fail to provide the substantive support for its c laims; and a political philosophy, though
similar to ide?logy insofar as both have an explana tory function ,
differs from ideology in that the motivation for direction of
political conduct are 1tot provided by every political philosophy,
whereas they are a part of every ideology. The latter is an
interesting case, since it is by venturing beyond the ideational
clement and appealing to what is called an "action-program"
that King distinguishes between ideology and political philo
sophy_. And this difference becomes even more pronounced
when we take into account the degree of commitment that is
shown by devotees of ideologies.
But this orientation towards action should not lead us to
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think that the sole concern of ideology is normative in nature,
i.e., with how the world should be. Although ideology does
contain such an element, th.is is not its only concern. Th.e
political theorist Willard A. Mullins writes of another concern
in his essay " On the Concept of Ideology in Political Science"
when he argues that ideology conceptua lizes and evaluates the
contours of reality, not simply as it might be shaped by politically organized huma,1 beings in the histo rical process, b ut also
as it exists.9 This conception of ideology reflects what the French
sociologist Raymond Boudon has called the "modern" definition
of ideology. It is an apt label because it reflects the recent trend
of defining ideology in terms of meaning rather than in terms of
truth and falsehood. IO T he French philosopher Raymond Aron
said it best when he wrote that "political ideologies always
combine more or less felicitously, factua l propositions and val ue
judgements. They express an ou tlook on the world and a willturned towards the future. " 11
What many call an ideology is typically one o f the " isms"
that have flourished in the twentieth century such as liberalism ,
conservatism, socialism, and feminism.

A lesser known but

just as noteworthy " ism" of our age is libertarian socialism or
anarchism, exemplified most notably in the work o f the American
philosopher and linguist Noam Chomsky. Perha~s n_owhere
docs Chomsky espouse this ideology as c learly as m his essay
"Notes o n Anarchism. " Originally wriuen as the introduction
to Daniel Guerin's Anarchism : From Theory to Practice, this
revised version is a spirited discourse on libertarian socialism,
which is libertarian in its opposi tion to "state intervention in
social life" and socialist in itsopposi tion to, among other th.ings,
the private ownership of then1eans of production. 12 And yet it
is a discuss ion of anarchism , for anarchism is nothing more than
the amalgam of libertaria n and socialist thought :
Anarchism is necessarily anticapita list in that it "opposes
the exploitation of man by man." But anarchis?1 a lso
opposes "the dominion of man over man ." It rns1st th_at
"socialism will be free or it will 1101 be at all:
its
recognition of this lies the genui ne and profound_ JUS!lficatfon for the existence of anarchism." From tlus point of
view, anarchism may be regarded as the libertarian wi ng
of socialism. '3

fo
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These components ere the cornerstones of bis anarchist vis,011
of a future society. ,. The libertarian component reflects the Idea
of freedom of self-realization that is found in Wilhelm von
Humboldt's liberal classic The Limits of State Action. rs But to
realize one's potential as a human being, Humboldt states, one
must be at liberty to do so. Thus "freedom is the first and
indispensable condition which the possibility of such a development presupposes. "' 6 It is small wonder, then, that classical
libertarian thought strongly opposes state intervention in the
social fife of its citizens. Its concern for liberty forges a critique
of statism, of the bureaucratic centralism and the coercive
machinery designed to realize the state's potentia l to control or
regulate an individual's pote ntia l. The anarchist is not, however, just a libertarian; he is a lso a socia list. As Guorin puts

it,

anarchism is rea lly a synonym for socialism. TJ1e anarch.ist['s] ... aim is to abolish the exploitation of man by
man. Anarchism is only one of the streams of socialist
thought, that stream whose ma in components are concern
for liberty and haste to abolish the State."
The key phrase here is " abolish the exploitation of man by mau,"
a clear reference to socialism. If there is a common denominator
among socialists, it is that they expose the defective nature of
capitalism. This critique of capitalism is most apparent when
it comes to the issues of economic monopolies and the ownership
of the means of production (i.e., factories, machinery and tools,
and raw .materials). Socialists of all kinds speak of the dismantling of such monopolies as well as the replacement of the
private ownership of some or all of the means of production
with some form of public or common ownership.
This atta ck on capitalism also shows up in other important
concerns found in socialist thought such as the wage system
( because it alienates the worker from his labor) and the cau ses
and effects of capitalist foreign economic expansion (i.e , imperialism and militarism). The latter is particularly important
for Chomsky, since it is directly related to his scathing criticism
of U.S. foreign policy. These conceros taken together thus
represent the underpionings of Chomsky's socialist bent, and
which allow him to give a meaningful apprehension to events in
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.
l ,c
' y· f
the world , events that a re related to a nation's forc,gn_po
Indeed if th.ere was ever a coherent and substanuve set o
ideas (and' associated values) that could influence how peoJJe
engage in the practice of making and implementrng pu_ ,c
Policy it is ljbertu ian socialism. What we have here rs .8
· · al , socra
· I, and economic
system• which touches upon the polrtrc
d.
aspects of life, and which attempts to provide an und~rsta:h•i:f
of these aspects as well as to suggest a progra_m of acll~h:~ "We
in its simplest form. might amount to ~otbrng mored Z") It
get closer to goal w by not doing action X, Y,_ an
t · ·ve
offers a general outlook as well as support for claims tha g,
· system hserves
h
meaning to events in the worId , M oreo ver, this
as a focal point foe the commitment of its devo t~es,_ eren t r':l;al
such commitment may result in a less than obJectrve app
of the events. Ye~ it does have the advantage of bei~g al>~~
mobilize and direct people towatd a goal, something w c
.
scientific tl\eories tend not to impart. .
Libertarian socialism, lik~ other ideologies, can thus ~
summarized as ( I) a system of political (as well as econo~rc
~, h arc coherent and substantive,
and social) ideas and values ww.c
.
Id
(2) which. ~ropose some understanding ?f ma~ and his wor
and (3) whiclt couple this understandmg w,th a prog,C:m 0
action to bring about the a ttainment of some group g~al.
.
What is important in this summary statement o_f rdeologyn~
rhat even with all the apparent di_fferences bet_w~en rdCO~~!ro:ful
scientific theory, it is the fu1\ct1on of pr~v1d111g a m
o
apprehension or- the world that is found rn both f~amewc;;;~;·
albeit each in their own particular way. The Amer'.c~rL p
.
sopher of science Norwood Russell Hanson, ,n wntmg about
theories of elementary physics in Paflern of Discovery, notes that
theories "offer an intelligible, systematic, conceptual patt~rn
f~r the observed data".19 Tbe scientist, through the form_ulah~~
of theories strives to provide a conceptual pattenJ w~tch w
allow data' to appear intelligible given the rest that ,s kno~n
.
. .
I11 other
about the items under mvesugauoo.
· words' theories
f
t
·
aspects
of
the
world.
ltelp us to make sense o cer a,n . . ·r, theories
qua cognitive

f

But if we acknowledge that sc1ent~,c
Id s urely we must
fun_ds are capable of making sense oft ~. wol1ru;ds also allow us
'd I ·es qua cognitive
also concede that , eo og1
.
through which the world,
to P(Opagate a network of meaning
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makes sense to us. Take, for instance, Chomsky's libertarian
socialism. His view of the world, both domestically and internationally, reflects his ideology; it predisposes him to view the
world in certain ways by setting limits to what principles and
interpretations of data can and cannot be accepted. His view
on world affairs thus offors on surprises given his adoption of
this brand of socialism. When he declares "that the United
States has become the most aggressive power in the world , the
greatest threat to peace, to national self-determination, and to
international cooperation," he is reiterating the view that the
United States is a power bent on imperialism.'° Jt is a claim
that is consistent with his ideology, since his anti-imperialist
stance is rooted in his endorsement of socialism and its critique
of capitalism. There is, however, another way in which his
ideology supports a rejection of imperialism. If we broaden
our definition of imperialism to include the domination and
control of the social and political life of one nation by another,
Chomsky's libertarian persp~ctive offers ample support for a
rejection of an imperialist foreign policy. The anarchist is not
oaly a socialist who opposes capitalism. he is also a li bertarian
wh:> opposes excessive state intervention in the lives of people,
whether its own citizens or those of another state. To say as
much, however, is to acknowledge that the thrust of the libertarian element of anarchism is to rtduce or eliminate the economic, political, and social exploitation and enslavement of
persons, thereby awakening their freedom of self-realization. It
is small wonder, then, that Chomsky's libertarianism provides
the foundation for his critique of American interventionism as
a force that impedes the development of human potential.
This does not mean, however, that ideologies and scientific
theories are one in the same. There are significant differences.
In theory construction, for instance, one becomes cognizant of a
problem in need of a solution, constructs an hypothesis H that
counts as a tentative solution, and tests H against experience via
natural observation and experimentation. The attitude of selfcriticism and desire for objectivity are particularly strong in this
endeavor. The scientist, in seeking to establish an hypothesis,
does so with an eye to abaadoning it if it is deemed necessary,
while satisfying the need for objectivity by relying on statements
that are intersubjectively testable. As a result, scientific theories
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tend to be amenable to change. The same cannot be said of an
ideology however. This is because an ideology's action-program
works a~ainst self<riticism and objectivity by inducing strong
commitments in their devotees, commitments which often .lead
to a distortion of the c:ntours of reality. Acknowledgment of
this is no better captured than in Edward Shil's remarks which
contrast ideology with science :
With reference to the cs>gnitive truthfulness of ideologies,
it should be pointed out that no great ideology has even
regarded the disciplined pursuit of truth_: ·by scientific procedures and in the mood characteristic of modern setenceas part of its obligations.
The ide,:ilogical culture ... d, es in fact o ften interfere
with the attainment of truth. This is, however, a result
of the closure of the ideological disposition to new evidence.
and its distrust of all who do not share the same ideological disposition. The chief source of tension between ideology and truth lies, therefore, in the concurrent _de_m~nds
of the exponents of ideologi~.s for unity and d1sc1phned
adherence on the part of their felbw believers. 21
It must be reiterated, however, that while science's adherence_ to
truth and objectivity is preferable to the false belief and subJe:tivity that ideology occasionally manifests, as when an 1de~logy s
cognitive claims are refuted or supplanted by those of a sc1ent1fic
theory, this opposition does not detract from the fact that both
science and ideology make the world a meaningful pla~e to_ hve.
And it is this sense-making quality that sustains the_ viabihty_ of
ideologies even if Huntington is correct about their dechmng
influence as sources of global conflict.
PART Two : THEO~IES ANO F ,.crs

J have so far sketched scientific theories and ideologies ~s
conceptual frameworks that make sense of the world. lnasmt:ch
as both theories and ideologies have this much in commo~ with .
each other, tho ugh, we need to consider the rclat1o?sh1ps between theories, ideologies, and facts, particularly since ~ensemaking is linked with statements of fact. But what 1s the
relationship between theories and -facts? To begin with, what
are facts?
·
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. Some theorists have acknowledged so-called " brute facts";
that is, facts that are "hard" and " known through observation."
Hanson says of these facts that
they are just the things that happen ; the hard, cold, stubborn facts, the sheer, physical, plain, and unvarnished facts,
the observable facts out there for all of us to see, come up
against, trip over. You know, we face the facts, collect
them: the little, detached, lawless, particular, and individual facts. Facts, in short, are just chunks of the material
world; sticks, stones, boxes, and bears. " 22
But if we take Hanson at his word, we must reject the very existence of such facts. Perhaps the most obvious criticism levelled
against conceiving facts in this way is that it totally disregards
the nonspatiality of facts. It is easy to imagine someone looking
at a pile of books and then bending over to collect them, but can
the same be said of facts? What would a " pile of facts" look
like?
A similar criticism is applicable to conceiving facts as situations (i.e., the circumstances of something a t a particular point
in time). To be sure, the tension and drama of those hold up
in Sarajevo and the surrounding countryside would be hard to
miss for a traveller to that region of the former Yugoslavia.
Their situation is unmistakably " tense" and " dramatic," but
facts do not typically carry such semantic baggage. Moreover,
one can obtain photographic documentation of the desperate
situation of the residents of Sarajevo, but the same cannot be
said of facts. What would it mean to photograph a fact ? But
if facts are not objects or situations that are found in the world,
what are they? One gets the distinct impression that philosophers like Strawson and Hanson neither wish to posit facts as
corporeal things in the world nor wish to disrupt the intimacy
that exists between facts and the world. The move away from
their corporeality is stressed in Strawson's assertion that facts
arc "wedded to 'that'·clauses." Unfortunately, be obscures his
discussion by taking refuge in talk of a fact as a "pseudo-material
correla le of the statement as a whole. ""
Likewise, Hanson understands facts to be neither items in
the world nor semantic entities like true statements. As Hanson
writes, "that-clauses are bits of language. Facts, we feel , are
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something more ... . There is nothing tangible between the
furniture of the world and our statements nbout the world, 011/y
that-clauses a,,d facts.''lA
Although Hanson admits to the elusiven~s of fa~ts, he is
not shy when it comes to presenting facts. Take, for mstan~,
his discussion of the members of t he phylum Chordata found m
Percept/011 a11d D/sco,-ery. One fact about chordates is expressed
in the following ' that'-clause :
(I) that they possess a notochord2'
Although a fact has been expressed to us, it has not been stated.
Statements arc either true or false, but 'that'-clauses do not
possess truth value. They arc simply the linguistic medium
through which facts are presented to us. However, statements
of fact can be made from ' that'-<:lauses. We can, for example,
transform (I) into the following statement of fact :
(2) Chordates possess notochords.
The result is a statement about a set of objects-the chordates-and
not n statement about a fact. A fact is, however, stated in (2).
How do we come to learn that (2) is a statement of fact?
By an empirical ioquuy. Of course. not every inquiry of this
kind will support a parficular statement as a statement of fact
and confirm that a particular 'that'-clause expresses a fact. Io
the case of chordates, an anatomical investigation of these creatures would allow us to determine whether chordates possess
notochords. This is not, however, the same as finding some·
thing under the epidermis that goes by the name of " The fact
that chordates possess a notochord." Facts are nothing of the
sort writes Hanson since "facts (are] ... constituted of no more
tha~ those aspects ~f the world that are expressible in that·
clauses. There is no more to the fact that chordates ha~e ?otochords than that the world is such that an aspect of it 1s ex26
pressible in the phrase 'that chordates possess notoc~~~s.'' "
Considered in this way, ' that'-clauses project the poss1b1bt1cs of
linguistic expression into the world, and it is through them that
the world becomes intelligible.
It should be clear that facts and language are intimately
associated with each other. ft is this association, however, that
underlies the relationship between facts and theories, for Hanson
writes that "our language, in the form of what we know, ~uts
an indelible stamp on what we see, and on what we appreciate
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· as the facts of nature. "27 Assuming that theories are part of
what we k11ow ab:>Ut nature, it follows that theories leave their
imprint on observations and facts. Linking facts, language, and
theories in this way, then, sheds light o n his claim that facts do
not "speak for themselves," but need to be "spoken for."28
More specifically, we have come to what I call Hanson's Theoryladeness of Fact 1hcsis (T J). This thesis may be presented as
follows:
Tl : Theories provide a framework of understanding
that is needed for "something" to be constituted or appreciated as a fact.
Let us examine this thesis in greater detail by reviewing Hanson's
discussion of the nineteenth-century controversy over the na ture
of light.
The following question was posed by physicists in the nineteenth century: Is the nature of light explained by the undulat?rY.
or wave theory or is explained by the corpuscular or particle
· theory? . As Hanson notes, it was generally agreed at that time
that "light must be either undulatory or corpuscular hut at least
o11e of these and not both. "29 Entertaining this idea as the central
assumption of their research, physicists drew Lpon their know. ledge of wave motion and sought the presence or absence of
interference phenomena as evidence for deciding between the two
theories. The most fundamental line of research grew directly
from the work of Augustin Fresnel (1788-l b27), whose experiments showed the presence of interference, indicated by the
pattern of light and dark fringes c.n a screen, and thus provided
experimental evidence ·tor the wave theory of light.
For Hanson, however, seeing ao interference pattern and
having factual support for the wave theory are nn one in the
same. This is because we do not see/acts! We see (and can
photograph) interference pattern (or patterns of light and dark
fringes), but we do n<>t see (and cannot photogrnph) fa<;ts.
This does not mean that facts are any less important. On
the cootran, facts are integral components of the sc.ientiiic enterprise- facts are cited to confirm or disconfirm th~ sorts_ of claims
that are made by scientists- and as Sllch, figure mto d1seuss1ons
of our ·seeing interference patterns and our acquiring support
for Lil<! ',\!~Ve theory. As Hanson writes, what
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persuades us that light is wavelike is the fact that when
two light beams of identical wave lengths overlap (in phase)
they interfere to produce a fringe-pattern. It is this fact
that confirms the hypothesis that light is wavelike, and
not the fringe-pattern itself. The fringe-pattern is not of
the right logical type to refute or deny any hypothesis or
theory. Fringe-pattern just are, like rocks aod blades of
grass. They are not assertive, hence they cannot confirm
or deny. 30
While scientific theories serve Lo constitute facts, and, thereby, statements of fact, at the same time theories also function to
constitute the sort of observations tha t play a role in whether a
factual statement becomes a statement of fact. Thus, from
Hanson's perspective, viewing bands of light and dark that
appear on a screen need not mean that the observer sees an
interference pattern. In a very basic way, we might think of the
observer's utterances as an indication of what he sees, the basis
upon which to decide if the observer sees light and dark bands
or interference patterns. That a person's speech is fundamentally
an expression of his cognitive fund is basic to the c1aim that

theory is integrated wiU1 observation, what Hanso n refers to as
the "theory-ladenness of observation."31 He maintains that
phenomena, like interference patterns,
can be appreciated only against a background of at least
some elementary wave theory, certain general principles
like that of the rectilinear propagation of light, and probably a good deal of experience with the characteristics of
water waves and sound waves. A very young child, whose
vision is every bit as good as ours, wi ll not see interference
fringes or diffraction patterns. He will see alternate bands
of light and dark- and that is all. And that is the substance of our own visual impression too, though for us it
is a sophisticated visual experience. We see interference
and diffraction ... . The significance we will attach to an
observation is pretty largely a reflection of what we have
been trained to regard as significant, which is just a way
of saying that we see every new experience only through
the lens of the knowledge we already possess. 32
Since the "conceptual repertoire" of the child differs greatly
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from that of the physicist- it Jacks the prerequisite concepts
that would allow the child to see the interference patterns that
are so commonplace for the physicist- it is small wonder that
the child sees only allernnle bands of light and dark.
The theory-ladenness of observation thus is consistent with
the idea that our " lens of knowledge" or conceptual repertoire"
is involved in the consititution or appreciation of facts. The
young child, who Jacks the conceptual repertoire of the physicist,
will not only be unable to see certain things and events, but the
child will also be unable 10 come to terms with the facts that
support the wave theory. Indeed, bow could a child appreciate
the fact that "when two light beams of identical wave lengths
overlap (in phase) they interfere to produce a fringe-pattern."
Moreover, if the child is unable to appreciate 1he facts 1hat favor
1he wave theory, then he will face the additional disadvantage
of being unable to draw inferences from those facts. So until
the child acquires some of the conceptual apparatus of the
physicist, he will be doomed to speak in 1crms of alternate bands
of light and dark.
But to say that the in ahility to appreciate certnin facts is
confined solely to children, is to te deluded of the grounds of
the scientific experience. While it is ,·cry likely that children
will have difficulty grasping scientilic facts, it may not t e an
experience that is peculiar to children. Indeed , it is likely that
scientists experience the same problem . Just imagine, for
instance, how dumbfounded Fresnel would have teen if he witnessed the Compton X-ray scauering experiments. Unprepared
to deal with the advances made by twentieth-century scientis1s,
Fresnel would have been unable {al least before he became
acquainted with the physics of our time) to appreciate the streaks
in a Wilson chamber as the "constituents of facts" that support
the particle theory of light. Thus, neither the child nor the
scientists can grapple with the facts of the Fresoel-Youngexperi·
ments or the Compton experiments u nless he has some understanding lo the theory oflight as wavelike or particlelike respectively. Such facts, so the adage goes, "need to be spoken for",
for their co ns1itution or appreciation occurs only by means of
acquiring the relevant conceptual apparatus. Or, as Hanson
puts it so succinctly, " Nothing can constitute a fact unless
1111derstood i11 terms of some theory. "l2 Theories thus help us

THE SEMBLANCE OF IDtOLOGlllS ANO SCIENTIFIC THEORIES

IS

to make sense of the world by allowing us to ct'me to terms with
facts.
P ART

Ill : I OEOLOC1t:s ANO FACTS

But can the same be said of ideologies? Do ideolories have
such a constitutional fc.ature ? I believe they do. Of the two
elements of ideoloJ!Y, the idcational clement proved to 1:e the
significant point of contact and between ideology and scientific
theory. Although much was made of ideology teing a coherent
and subs1antive system of ideas that offers a view of how reolity
ought to be, this normative function must not overshadow its
conceptualization of "the contours of reality" as it is. If we
acknowledge that ideology h2s a cosnitive role to play in assist·
ing us in making sense of the world that we live in, then we
have little choice but to modify Tl in order to recognize the
contribution of ideologies in the constitution of certain facts.
One need only recall the 'that'-clause of Chomsky's that I cited
in Part One to get a sense of the sort of facts that are constituted
by ideologies and that come to lhc forefront of ideological dis•
pules. The new thesis, then, can 1,e rend in the following woy:
T2 : Ideologies provide a framework of understanding that
is needed for " something" to be con stituted or appreciated as a fact.
Both science and ideology allow us to live in a world that is
meaningful, a world in which we recognize certain items as
facts. In reference to science, this statement is beyond question.
However, Tl asserted lhe theory-ladenness of fact as if it were
confined strictly to matters of science. To the extent that ideologies contribute meaning, the thesis cannot be res1ricted in this
way . To argue, as Huntington does, that ideologies are no
longer the prime movers of global politics, is a bit premature,
for it is to imply that either ideologies have suddenly and
mysteriously lost their capability to make such a contribution
and, tl1U~, no longer constitute facts, or their contribution is
one that is no longer accepted by those who once took ideologies
to be the guiding light of politics. To sug&est the former is to
take lightl~ the. se~sc-making quality that ideolories have in
common with. sc1cnt1fic theories; to argue the latter is a legiti·
mate ~onte.nt.JOn, but ?ne that needs to be explored with !great
care, since 1t 1s not obvious why after so many years "clashes of
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ideologies" have been replaced with " clashes of civilizations."
But wha1ever the case, the fcrmulation T2, \\ilh all its consequences for Huntington's thesis, [etms 10 te one that we must
acknowledge.
O
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